Personality Psychology and the Hypothetical-Deductive Model of Explanation
- 85 Downloads
I have claimed that the hypothetical-deductive model proposes an explanation of observable events which involves theorizing about underlying, nonobservable causes. In psychology the realm of the mental has generally been thought of as making up the hidden underworld of causes of what people say and do. My aim was to show that this general conception of how psyche is related to our words and deeds is questionable. It was argued that psyche comprises (extends into) what we say and do and that behaving and using language in certain ways in certain situations may be cases (and not effects) of mental phenomena. Alston’s main point is that although this may be true for such phenomena as intention, thought, desire, and feeling (and possibly for some dispositions), there are other mental phenomena, which I have not discussed, which are genuinely nonobservable causes of behavior and which form the really important theoretical variables of psychology.
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- Elster, J. (1979). Forklaring og dialektikk. Oslo: Pax.Google Scholar
- Gauld, A., & Shotter, J. (1977). Human action and its psychological investigation. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
- McGinn, C. (1982). The character of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Mischel, T. (1969). Scientific and philosophical psychology: A historical introduction. In T. Mischel (Ed.), Human action, conceptual and empirical issues (pp. 1–40). New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
- Naess, A., Ariansen, P., & Madsen, K. (1980). Vitenskapsfilosofi. Oslo: Universitetsforlaget.Google Scholar
- Popper, K. R. (1963). Conjectures and refutations. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.Google Scholar
- Schafer, R. (1973). Action: Its place in psychoanalytic interpretation and theory. Annual of Psychoanalysis, 1, 159–196.Google Scholar
- Schafer, R. (1976). A new language for psychoanalysis. New Haven: Yale University Press.Google Scholar
- Searle, J. R. (1971). The philosophy of language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
- Smedslund, J. (1984). What is necessarily true in psychology. In J. R. Royce & L P. Mos (Eds.), Annals of theoretical psychology (Vol. 2, pp. 241–272). New York: Plenum Press.Google Scholar
- Vollmer, F. (1984). Årsaksforhold i psykologien. Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift, 19, 173–192.Google Scholar