Abstract
It is often said that distribution is the “Dark Continent” in the Japanese economy. Traditional models of industrial organization have difficulty of explaining the existence of distribution systems, i.e., a sequence of intermediaries which connect producers with consumers. In our opinion, a suitable framework has yet to be invented for the analysis of distributive intermediation. The purpose of this paper is to explore the informational role of intermediaries in the market economy, thus shedding new light on the Dark Continent.
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Sakai, Y., Sasaki, K. (1996). Demand Uncertainty and Distribution Systems: Information Acquisition and Transmission. In: Sato, R., Ramachandran, R., Hori, H. (eds) Organization, Performance and Equity. Research Monographs in Japan-U.S. Business & Economics, vol 1. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6267-2_2
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-6267-2_2
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