Abstract
Industrial economists are traditionally concerned about the outcome of the competitive market process. If high market performance is observed (e.g. in terms of rate of returns on invested capital) industrial economists quarrel whether this is the result of an efficient, welfare enhancing competitive process or the result of collusion among producers to the expense of consumers. There is an extensive literature on the efficiency versus collusion controversy. However, only a few studies had a significant impact on this discussion. Among these is the work by Professor Neumann.1 His contribution is particularly valuable, since he succeeded in showing that “… theory is only useful where it is testable and tested …”, as Leonard W. Weiss (1985, p. 87) convincingly expressed.
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Schwalbach, J., Schwerk, A. (1999). Stability of German Cartels. In: Mueller, D.C., Haid, A., Weigand, J. (eds) Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_6
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