Abstract
Competition policy in industrial economies typically combines a general policy of independent action by independent firms with a menu of exceptions. The entries on the menu of exceptions differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Many systems allow independent firms to cooperate on basic research and development; some allow cooperation in production, under certain conditions; other do not. In this chapter I discuss depression cartels, which have a history of inclusion in the list of exceptions to the general rule of independent actions by independent firms. I distinguish between depression cartels and rationalization cartels.
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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
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Martin, S. (1999). Depression Cartels, Market Structure, and Performance. In: Mueller, D.C., Haid, A., Weigand, J. (eds) Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_5
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_5
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