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The Use of Game Theoretical Models for Empirical Industrial Organization

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Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare

Abstract

Game theoretical models have become the state of the art in industrial organization. This paper surveys the empirical research in industrial organization, inspired by noncooperative game theoretical models. Empirical research motivated by game theory is in an “early stage of the product cycle”, which implies that topics, and methodology, are not yet standardized. We specifically try to force structure into the existing literature and attempt to indicate into which direction research could go.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Austrian Institute of Economic Research, University of Linz, Austria

    Karl Aiginger

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  1. Karl Aiginger
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Vienna, Austria

    Dennis C. Mueller

  2. Deutsches Institut für Wirtshaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin, Germany

    Alfred Haid

  3. University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

    Jürgen Weigand

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Aiginger, K. (1999). The Use of Game Theoretical Models for Empirical Industrial Organization. In: Mueller, D.C., Haid, A., Weigand, J. (eds) Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_13

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_13

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7542-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-5559-9

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