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Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare pp 199–222Cite as

Theories of Industrial Organization and Competition Policy

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Abstract

Industrial Organization has provided numerous researches which have enlightened the real world of competition and, simultaneously, has elaborated important concepts, typologies and models that reveal the richness of corporate conduct. In turn, these developments have improved the quality of analyses of public policies, mainly in the area of antitrust policy. Manfred Neumann has made very important contributions in all three domains, applied, theoretical and public policy.1 In the following article, I hope to demonstrate the importance of his work and how we share many ideas in relation to current views and uncertainties.

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. European Commission, Germany

    Alexis Jacquemin (Chief Advisor)

  2. Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium

    Alexis Jacquemin (Chief Advisor)

Authors
  1. Alexis Jacquemin
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Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Vienna, Austria

    Dennis C. Mueller

  2. Deutsches Institut für Wirtshaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin, Germany

    Alfred Haid

  3. University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany

    Jürgen Weigand

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© 1999 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht

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Jacquemin, A. (1999). Theories of Industrial Organization and Competition Policy. In: Mueller, D.C., Haid, A., Weigand, J. (eds) Competition, Efficiency, and Welfare. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_11

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-5559-9_11

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7542-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-5559-9

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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