Abstract
The debate between those that study international conflict from the systemic level and those that examine it from the nation-state level has been overtaken by a new focus on dyads. Questions about why a nation goes to war — what attributes make a nation more or less “war-prone” — or what system configurations — distribution of power, alliance arrangements — account for the greatest amount of war, have recently been replaced with a new concern for “enduring” or long term rivalries between pairs of states.2 Why do certain pairs of states engage in serious conflict after serious conflict while the members of many other dyads have little to no conflict between them.3 Since, as discussed by various writers,4 the choice of the level of analysis can have a critical impact on the statement of the research question and consequently on the answers obtained, it would be desirable if inter-nation conflict processes could be studied at several levels simultaneously. Here we propose a means for accomplishing this, together with analyses that illustrate both the significance and the interplay between these levels.
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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Muncaster, R.G., Zinnes, D.A. (1998). A Model of Dispute Sequences. In: Wolfson, M. (eds) The Political Economy of War and Peace. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 64. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4961-1_13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4961-1_13
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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