Abstract
Past research on corruption, both prolific and with a long history, covers many fields. It is not the intention of this chapter to faithfully survey where research stands today or to give an objective and comprehensive view of the many paths such research could take in the future.1 Instead, I try to discuss areas of research emphasis for the next phase of corruption research in an admittedly selective fashion, explicitly recognizing the author’s bias as an operationally-oriented research economist. As such this chapter aims at putting some heretofore under-emphasized issues at the forefront of discussion, as well as furthering debate on unresolved issues.2
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Kaufmann, D. (1998). Research on Corruption: Critical Empirical Issues. In: Jain, A.K. (eds) Economics of Corruption. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 65. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4935-2_7
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