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Models of Corruption

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Economics of Corruption

Part of the book series: Recent Economic Thought Series ((RETH,volume 65))

Abstract

How can corruption be defined? What are the different types of corruption? What, if any, is the distinction between rent-seeking and corruption? What do we include in our definition, what do we exclude?

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Concordia University, Canada

    Arvind K. Jain

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  1. Arvind K. Jain
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Concordia University, Canada

    Arvind K. Jain

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© 1998 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Jain, A.K. (1998). Models of Corruption. In: Jain, A.K. (eds) Economics of Corruption. Recent Economic Thought Series, vol 65. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4935-2_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4935-2_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7239-4

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-4935-2

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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