Abstract
People punish others for “unfair behavior” even when it is costly for them to do so. In the experiment, the effects of revenge and education were isolated as motives for punishment. Significantly less punishment was observed when either of the two motives was eliminated.
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Gneezy, U., Stoler, A. (2000). Why Punish? Norms and Revenge in an Experimental Game. In: Patrone, F., García-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. (eds) Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_8
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