Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in
Book cover

Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory pp 53–73Cite as

The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction

  • Chapter

Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 23))

Abstract

In February 1998 the Dutch government auctioned licences to operate mobile telecommunications networks according to the DCS-1800 technology. Two “national” licences and sixteen “regional” ones were auctioned by using a variant of the simultaneous, multiple round auction that was proposed by US-economists and that had been tested in the US. This paper describes how the decision to auction came about, it details the auction rules, and it analyzes the resulting outcomes.

*

The author thanks Emiel Maasland and Pieter Ruys for comments on an earlier version. The paper also benefitted from discussions during conferences in Mannheim (ESA), Barcelona (Spanish Game Theory Meeting), Genoa (Game Practice Meeting) and Berlin (EEA).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution.

Chapter
USD   29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD   39.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD   54.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Learn about institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Bykowsky M., M. Olson en A. Schram. “Veiling van etherfrequenties.” Economisch Statistische Berichten, 1-3-1995, 201–205.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bykowsky, M., R. Cull and J. Ledyard. “Mutually destructive bidding: the FCC auction design problem.” Social Science Working Paper 916 Cal. Tech. 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cramton, P. “Money out of thin air: the nationwide narrowband PCS Auction.” J. Economics and Management Strategy 4 (1995) 267–345

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cramton, P. “The PCS spectrum auctions: An early assessment.” J. Econ. Manag. Strat. 6 (1997) 431–497

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Damme, E.E.C. van. “Aanbesteding en veilingmechanismen. Economische theorie en toepassingen.” Research Series on Competition. Ministry of Economic Affairs, January 1997a.

    Google Scholar 

  • Damme, E.E.C. van. “Tien misverstanden over veilingen.” Economisch Statistische Berichten, January 8, 1997b.

    Google Scholar 

  • Damme, E.E.C. van. “Veilen in de praktijk: mobiele telefonie frequenties.” Economisch Statistische Berichten, April 10, 1998.

    Google Scholar 

  • DDV Telecommunications consultancy “Het veilen van frequenties: verslag van de consultatieronden”. (Inclusief binnengekomen schriftelijke reacties). (1996)

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission: “Directive 96/2/EG of January 16, 1996 concerning a change in directive 90/388/EEG with respect to mobile and personal communication.” PB L20, 26/1/96.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Commission: “Green paper on mobile and personal communication.” (...) HDTP: “Frequentiebeleid in Nederland; communicerende golven.” Ministerie van Verkeer en Waterstaat. Groningen, 1993.

    Google Scholar 

  • Keuter, A. and L. Nett: “Ermes-auction in Germany”. Telecommunications Policy 21 (1997) 297–307

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McAfee, R.P. and J. McMillan. “Analyzing the airwaves auction.” J. Economic Perspectives 10 (1996) 159–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMillan, J. “Selling spectrum rights.” J. Economic Perspectives 8 (1994) 145–162.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • McMillan, J. “Why auction the spectrum?” Telecommunications Policy 19 (1995) 191–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P. “Auction theory for privatization.” Manuscript of a book to be published by Cambridge University Press, Stanford University, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  • Milgrom, P. “Game Theory and the spectrum auctions.” Eur. Econ. Review 42 (1998) 771–778.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Olsen, M., A. Schram and F. van Winden: “De veiling van etherfrequenties door de overheid; een verslag van de bevindingen van CREED”. Report dated September 30, 1996.

    Google Scholar 

  • Onderstal, S. “The racket auction.” Discussion paper, CentER, Tilburg University, 1999.

    Google Scholar 

  • Shubik, M. “The dollar auction: a paradox in non-cooperative behavior and escalation.” J. Conflict Resolution 15 (1971) 109–111.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tweede Kamer: “Wijziging van de wet op de telecommunicatievoorziening in verband met de invoering van het veilen van schaarse frequenties voor Systemen van digitale mobiele telecommunicatie.” Kamerstuk 25171, nr. 1,2, 1996-1997.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. CentER, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 5000, LE TILBURG, The Netherlands

    Eric Van Damme

Authors
  1. Eric Van Damme
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. University of Genoa, Italy

    Fioravante Patrone

  2. University Santiago de Compostella, Spain

    Ignacio García-Jurado

  3. Tilburg University, The Netherlands

    Stef Tijs

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Van Damme, E. (2000). The Dutch DCS-1800 Auction. In: Patrone, F., García-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. (eds) Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_5

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_5

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7092-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-4627-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics

Search

Navigation