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Part of the book series: Theory and Decision Library ((TDLC,volume 23))

Abstract

Markets evolve, but they are also designed. Entrepreneurs and managers, legislators and regulators, lawyers and judges, all get involved, at least indirectly, in market design. Recently game theorists have also started to take a direct role in design. This is a natural development, because game theory is the part of economics that deals with the “rules of the game” that define market operations.

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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Roth, A.E. (2000). Game Theory as a Tool for Market Design. In: Patrone, F., García-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. (eds) Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_2

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-7092-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-4627-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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