Abstract
This paper studies an important type of production problems in which production takes place in several stages. These problems are modeled as sequential production games, a specific class of extensive form games with imperfect information. These games are related to potential games. Despite the presence of imperfect information, it is shown that pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibria do exist, thus allowing for easily adopt able recommendations to firms seeking the advice of game theorists.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Voorneveld, M., Tijs, S., Mallozzi, L. (2000). Sequential Production Situations and Potentials. In: Patrone, F., GarcÃa-Jurado, I., Tijs, S. (eds) Game Practice: Contributions from Applied Game Theory. Theory and Decision Library, vol 23. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_16
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4627-6_16
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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