Key Considerations Governing the Choice of Monetary Policy Strategy

  • Aerdt C. F. J. Houben
Part of the Financial and Monetary Policy Studies book series (FMPS, volume 34)


At an abstract level, the choice of monetary policy strategy is determined first by the relationships underlying the economy and second by the desired reaction function of the central bank to economic developments. The former is a function of the structural characteristics of the economy and of the nature of disturbances to which the economy is likely to be subjected. The latter depends on the authorities’ prioritisation of economic objectives in the face of different transitory disturbances. And the interrelation between the two is driven by political economy variables, which inter alia determine the credibility of the authorities’ monetary policy commitments. This chapter elaborates on these general considerations determining the monetary strategy choice, drawing on the large body of related theoretical literature. The objective is to provide a normative backdrop against which to evaluate the development of European monetary strategies in practice.


Exchange Rate Interest Rate Monetary Policy Central Bank Money Demand 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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    Poole’s original analysis is based on a closed-economy Hicksian IS-LM model and is cast in terms of an interest rate or money supply rule. Notwithstanding its limitations, the straightforward and intuitively appealing set-up of the model provides an attractive theoretical basis to gauge the implications of adopting different monetary policy targets. The framework is also applicable to open economies: in the absence of restrictions on capital flows, an interest rate rule is comparable to an exchange rate rule with the interest rate fixed by the external anchor. In this sense, the standard framework amalgamates the instruments, operational targets and intermediate targets of monetary policy; to avoid ambiguity, these are communally referred to as ‘targets’.Google Scholar
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    These studies have produced very different results and a consensus opinion on the degree of differences in monetary policy transmission has not emerged — not even at a general level (see Kieler and Saarenheimo (1998)). In part, this reflects the diverse methods used in the empirical literature: the studies have included straightforward structural analyses (focusing on differences in financial structures), large macroeconometric models (constructed on a single-and multi-country basis), small macroeconomic models, and structural VAR models. The greatest cross-national differences appear in the studies based on estimates of large, single-country macroeconometric models (see for instance Dornbusch, Favero and Giavazzi (1998)), but the statistical comparability of the results is limited by the variation in model specification. By contrast, the multi-country model approach suggests relatively small differences in monetary transmission, but this may be attributed to the similar structure that such an approach imposes on all the countries. Given their more aggregated nature, small macroeconomic models may likewise do insufficient justice to cross-country diversity in economic structure. In turn, studies using structural VAR models may be questioned on account of the uncertainties involved in the structural identification schemes. Moreover, even within this specific approach, the results have not been uniform: while Ramaswamy and Sloek (1997) find output responding more slowly but cumulatively more strongly in some EU countries than in others, Barran, Coudert and Mojon (1996) also identify differences in the output response to monetary policy changes (as well as in the response of the final demand components), but find a reasonably similar pass-through in terms of timing. The varying strength of individual transmission channels in European countries is analysed in De Bondt (1999) and Kakes (2000).Google Scholar
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    The evidence suggests inflation has an adverse, non-linear effect on growth which is difficult to establish when inflation is relatively low (see Fischer 1996). In a study of inflation in 87 countries (including 13 of the current EU member states) during 1970–90, Sarei (1996) finds a structural break at 8 percent. Above this level, inflation has a very powerful negative influence on growth. Similarly, using a data set comprising 145 countries over the period 1960–1996, Ghosh and Phillips (1998) establish a negative relationship between inflation and growth that is both statistically and economically significant and survives a battery of robustness checks. They suggest the relationship is non-linear in two senses: first, at very low rates the relationship is positive (a kink is tentatively estimated at about 2½ per cent) and, second, although the cumulative effect of inflation on growth rises as inflation increases, the marginal effect becomes smaller.Google Scholar
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    An example of transparency that would likely cause confusion is if, on account of differences of opinion within the policy setting body, the central bank published more than one inflation forecast under a direct inflation targeting strategy. This is not far-fetched fiction: the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee has indicated that it will report separate inflation forecasts if its individual members disagree about the validity of certain aspects underlying the forecasts; see Budd (1998, p. 1793).Google Scholar
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    This point is made by Goodfriend (1986) in a comprehensive review of standard central bank arguments for secrecy in the implementation of monetary policy. His assessment is based on the US Federal Reserve Bank’s defence of secrecy as argued in the 1975–81 court proceedings against the Federal Open Market Committee under the Freedom of Information Act. On balance, he finds the theoretical arguments for secrecy to be at best inconclusive.Google Scholar
  86. 86.
    Even the minutes of the meetings of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee (renowned for its transparency creed) do not attribute individual contributions to policy discussions. This is done in order to ensure that individual members do not feel restricted in advancing arguments that they may not personally support, but do wish to have fully explored. See Budd (1998, p. 1789).Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2000

Authors and Affiliations

  • Aerdt C. F. J. Houben
    • 1
  1. 1.De Nederlandsche BankAmsterdamThe Netherlands

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