Abstract
In this chapter we will consider feasible coalitions of players by using a class of combinatorial geometries called matroids. Let us assume that there are two rules of cooperation between players:
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If a coalition can form, then any subcoalition is also feasible. In general, the players that take part in the formation of a coalition have common interests. Therefore, any subset of these players have at least the same common interests.
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If there are two coalitions where the cardinal differs in one element, a player of the largest can join with the smallest making a feasible coalition.
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© 2000 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Bilbao, J.M. (2000). Values for games on matroids. In: Cooperative Games on Combinatorial Structures. Theory and Decision Library, vol 26. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4393-0_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4393-0_8
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-6976-9
Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-4393-0
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