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Establishing Command Intent—A Case Study

The Encirclement of the Ruhr, March 1945

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Abstract

In March 1945, during the campaign against Germany, the United States Army conducted an operation that showed its proficiency: the encirclement of the Ruhr.2The establishment of command intent was central to the success of this operation. While U.S. Army doctrine at the time did not explicitly describe the meaning and composition of the term command intent(sometimes also called commander’s intent), the conduct of this operation demonstrated an understanding of these concepts that had been acquired through practice at all tactical levels. The encirclement of the Ruhr, conducted both to deny resources to the German army and to draw the remainder of the Germany army’s forces to battle in the region’s defence, had always been oneof the campaign’s strategic objectives. However, the encirclement and its exact direction and force requirements were decided only as operations progressed (SHAEF, 1946).3 Implicit command intent guided the tactical decisions made as the operation progressed and linked subordinates’ exercise of initiative and coordination by tactical formations in the decentralized execution of operations. This decentralized execution of operations is the desired outcome of the mission command approach.

Article Footnote

1The views expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the U S Department of the Army, the U S Department of Defense, or the U S. Government

2An industrial region of roughly 16,000 km2(approximately 6,200 square miles) in northwest Germany (between the Lippe and Ruhr Rivers) that was strategically important for the German war matenal production system and for its steel, synthetic oil, and chemical industries

3For general histories of the encirclement of the Ruhr, see MacDonald (1973), Pogue (1954), Toland (1965), and Weigley (1981) The Combat Studies Institute prepared a study of the same operation (Connor, 1987) for HQ, TRADOC (Headquarters, U S Army Training and Doctrine Command), to support developing U S Army doctrine at the operational level of war

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Connor, W.M. (2000). Establishing Command Intent—A Case Study. In: McCann, C., Pigeau, R. (eds) The Human in Command. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4229-2_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4229-2_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-6899-1

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-4229-2

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