Abstract
In this chapter a game theoretic analysis of ground-water use and drainage water management is introduced. Model simulations using parameters relevant to the San Joaquin Valley (Valley) are presented to illustrate the different types of behavior that might be observed and to quantify the benefit losses of different management strategies. The implications of these models for ground-water and drainage policy are also discussed.
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© 1991 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Dixon, L.S. (1991). Common Property Aspects of Ground-Water Use and Drainage Generation. In: Dinar, A., Zilberman, D. (eds) The Economics and Management of Water and Drainage in Agriculture. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4028-1_34
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-4028-1_34
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
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