Abstract
The prospect of lucrative post-retirement opportunities can color the way regulators evaluate firm performance. This is especially so when revolving doors allow regulated firms to “capture” their regulators. When the public must mainly rely on regulators to see that costs and demands are accurately measured and reported when rates are set, this view of revolving doors is especially compelling.
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Salant, D.J. (1992). A New Look at Public Utility Regulation Through a Revolving Door. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Economic Innovations in Public Utility Regulation. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 10. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3586-7_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3586-7_9
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