Abstract
1969 was a major turning point in the application and development of antitrust principles derived from the Sherman Act’s ban on monopolization and attempted monopolization.1 In 1969 the Department of Justice began two lawsuits whose outcome deeply influenced the direction of antitrust policy concerning single-firm conduct. The first was a heralded assault on IBM’s dominance in the computer industry.2 On the last day of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, the Justice Department accused IBM of using predatory pricing, product development, and promotion tactics to suppress rival producers of mainframe computers and peripheral equipment. By the time the Antitrust Division conceded defeat in 1982, the case had devoured massive resources and had become a singular symbol of prosecutorial failure. Pre-trial discovery generated 91 million pages of documents and over 1300 depositions. The trial consumed 700 days in court, the transcript topped 104,000 pages, and the parties introduced over 17,000 exhibits. The government’s cost of bringing the suit surpassed $17 million, and IBM’s legal fees exceeded this amount severalfold (Kovacic 1989a). The IBM case, said one observer, was “the Antitrust Division’s Vietnam” (Baker 1986, 899).
Access this chapter
Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout
Purchases are for personal use only
Preview
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
References
Areeda, P. 1990. “Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles. ” Antitrust Law Journal 58: 841–53.
Areeda, P., and H. Hovenkamp. 1991. Antitrust Law: Supplement. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Areeda, P., and D. Turner. 1978. Antitrust Law (Vol. III). Boston: Little, Brown & Co.
Baker, D. 1986. “Government Enforcement of Section Two.” Notre Dame Law Review 61: 898–927.
Blumenthal, W. 1990. “Three Vexing Issues Under the Essential Facilities Doctrine: ATM Networks as Illustration.” Antitrust LawJourna l58: 855–69.
Charles River Associates. 1990. “Energy/Utilities Panel.” In Economists’ Perspectives on Antitrust Today: Antitrust in Regulated Industries. Boston: Charles River Associates.
Coll, S. 1986. The Deal of theCentury: TheBreakup of AT&T. New York: Simon & Shuster.
Collins, W. “Electic Utility Rate Regulation: Curing Economic Shortcomings Through Competition.” Tulsa Law Journal 19: 141–91.
Costello, K. 1988. “The Struggle Over Electricity Transmission Access.” Cato Journal 8: 107–24.
Flynn, J. 1990. “Discussion: Legal Approach to Market Dominance: Assessing Market Power in Antitrust Cases.” In Telecommunications Deregulation-Market Power and Cost Allocation Issues, edited by J. Allison & B. Thomas. New York: Quorum Books.
Hurwitz, J., and W. Kovacic. 1982. “Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends.” Vanderbilt Law Review 35: 63–157.
Joskow, P., and R. Schmalensee. 1983. Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electrical Utility Deregulation. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.
Jurewitz, J. 1988. “The Electricity Transmission Access Debate.” (Mimeo).
Kahn, A. 1986. “The Theory and Application of Regulation.” Antitrust Law Journal 55: 177–84.
Kahn, E. 1988. Electric Utility Planning and Regulation. Washington, D.C.: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy.
Kovacic, W. 1989a. “Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration.” Iowa Law Review 74: 1105–50.
Kovacic, W. 1989b. “Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases.” Research in Law & Economics 12: 173–206.
Kovacic, W.1990. `The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy.“ Wayne Law Review 36: 1413–71.
Kovacic, W. 1991. “Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight.” (Mimeo).
Kriz, M. 1991 (April 6). “Power Struggle.”National Journal 23: 789.
Liebeler, W. 1986. “Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita” Notre Dame Law Review 61: 1052–98.
Mahinka, S. 1989. “Antitrust Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct.”Antitrust Law Journal 57: 751–68.
Meeks, J. 1972. “Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy.” Columbia Law Review 72: 64–130.
Norton, F., and M. Early. 1984. “Limitations on the Obligation to Provide Access to Electric Transmission and Distribution Lines.” Energy Law Journal 5: 47–76.
O’Connor, P, S. Levin, J. Cahill, and G. Keenan. 1988. “The Transition to Competition in the Electric Utility Industry.” Journal of Energy Law and Policy 8: 223–51.
Owen, B. 1990. “Determining Optimal Access to Regulated Essential Facilities.” Antitrust Law Journal 58: 887–94.
Pace, J. 1987. “Wheeling and the Obligation to Serve.” Energy Law Journal 8: 265–302.
Pace, J., and J. Landon. 1982. “Introducing Competition into the Electric Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal.” Energy Law Journal 3: 1–65.
Panel Discussion. 1989. “Exclusionary Conduct.” Antitrust Law Journal 57: 723–50.
Phillips, A. 1990. “Antitrust Principles and Regulatory Needs.” Antitrust Bulletin 35: 631–75.
Pfeffer, J. 1985 (October 31). “Policies Governing Transmission Access and Pricing: The Wheeling Debate Revisited.” Public Utilities Fortnightly 26.
Pierce, R. 1986. “A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power.” Virginia Law Review 72: 1183–1235.
Pierce, R. 1991. “Using the Gas Industry as a Guide to Reconstituting the Electricity Industry.” Research in Law and Economics 13: 7–56.
Ratner, J. 1988. “Should There Be An Essential Facility Doctrine?” University of California at Davis Law Review 21: 327–82.
Rosso, D. 1989 (February 16). `Transmission Access — A Crucial Issue for an Industry.“ Public Utilities Fortnightly 18.
Smith, V. 1987. “Currents of Competition in Electricity Markets.” Regulation 11, no. 2: 23–29.
Temin, P. 1987. The Fall of the Bell System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Troy, D. 1983. “Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine.” Columbia Law Review 83: 441–87.
Tye, W. 1987. “Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine.” Energy Law Journal 8: 337–79.
Tye, W. 1991. TheTransition to Deregulation—Developing Economic Standards for Public Policies. New York: Quorum Books.
U.S. Office of Technology Assessment. 1989. Electric Power Wheeling and Dealing: Technological Considerations for Increasing Competition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.
Watson, K., andT. Brunner. 1977. “Monopolization by Regulated ‘Monopolies’: The Search for Substantive Standards.” Antitrust Bulletin 22: 559–92.
Weiss, L. 1975. “Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry.” In Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets, edited by A. Phillips. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
Werden, G. 1987. `The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine.“ St. Louis University Law Journal 32: 433–80.
Editor information
Editors and Affiliations
Rights and permissions
Copyright information
© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media New York
About this chapter
Cite this chapter
Kovacic, W.E. (1992). The Antitrust Law and Economics of Essential Facilities in Public Utility Regulation. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Economic Innovations in Public Utility Regulation. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 10. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3586-7_1
Download citation
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3586-7_1
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-6594-5
Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-3586-7
eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive