Skip to main content

The Antitrust Law and Economics of Essential Facilities in Public Utility Regulation

  • Chapter
Economic Innovations in Public Utility Regulation

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series ((TREP,volume 10))

Abstract

1969 was a major turning point in the application and development of antitrust principles derived from the Sherman Act’s ban on monopolization and attempted monopolization.1 In 1969 the Department of Justice began two lawsuits whose outcome deeply influenced the direction of antitrust policy concerning single-firm conduct. The first was a heralded assault on IBM’s dominance in the computer industry.2 On the last day of Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, the Justice Department accused IBM of using predatory pricing, product development, and promotion tactics to suppress rival producers of mainframe computers and peripheral equipment. By the time the Antitrust Division conceded defeat in 1982, the case had devoured massive resources and had become a singular symbol of prosecutorial failure. Pre-trial discovery generated 91 million pages of documents and over 1300 depositions. The trial consumed 700 days in court, the transcript topped 104,000 pages, and the parties introduced over 17,000 exhibits. The government’s cost of bringing the suit surpassed $17 million, and IBM’s legal fees exceeded this amount severalfold (Kovacic 1989a). The IBM case, said one observer, was “the Antitrust Division’s Vietnam” (Baker 1986, 899).

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this chapter

Chapter
USD 29.95
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
eBook
USD 129.00
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Available as PDF
  • Read on any device
  • Instant download
  • Own it forever
Softcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Compact, lightweight edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info
Hardcover Book
USD 169.99
Price excludes VAT (USA)
  • Durable hardcover edition
  • Dispatched in 3 to 5 business days
  • Free shipping worldwide - see info

Tax calculation will be finalised at checkout

Purchases are for personal use only

Institutional subscriptions

Preview

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.

References

  • Areeda, P. 1990. “Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles. ” Antitrust Law Journal 58: 841–53.

    Google Scholar 

  • Areeda, P., and H. Hovenkamp. 1991. Antitrust Law: Supplement. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Areeda, P., and D. Turner. 1978. Antitrust Law (Vol. III). Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

    Google Scholar 

  • Baker, D. 1986. “Government Enforcement of Section Two.” Notre Dame Law Review 61: 898–927.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blumenthal, W. 1990. “Three Vexing Issues Under the Essential Facilities Doctrine: ATM Networks as Illustration.” Antitrust LawJourna l58: 855–69.

    Google Scholar 

  • Charles River Associates. 1990. “Energy/Utilities Panel.” In Economists’ Perspectives on Antitrust Today: Antitrust in Regulated Industries. Boston: Charles River Associates.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coll, S. 1986. The Deal of theCentury: TheBreakup of AT&T. New York: Simon & Shuster.

    Google Scholar 

  • Collins, W. “Electic Utility Rate Regulation: Curing Economic Shortcomings Through Competition.” Tulsa Law Journal 19: 141–91.

    Google Scholar 

  • Costello, K. 1988. “The Struggle Over Electricity Transmission Access.” Cato Journal 8: 107–24.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flynn, J. 1990. “Discussion: Legal Approach to Market Dominance: Assessing Market Power in Antitrust Cases.” In Telecommunications Deregulation-Market Power and Cost Allocation Issues, edited by J. Allison & B. Thomas. New York: Quorum Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hurwitz, J., and W. Kovacic. 1982. “Judicial Analysis of Predation: The Emerging Trends.” Vanderbilt Law Review 35: 63–157.

    Google Scholar 

  • Joskow, P., and R. Schmalensee. 1983. Markets for Power: An Analysis of Electrical Utility Deregulation. Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jurewitz, J. 1988. “The Electricity Transmission Access Debate.” (Mimeo).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, A. 1986. “The Theory and Application of Regulation.” Antitrust Law Journal 55: 177–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kahn, E. 1988. Electric Utility Planning and Regulation. Washington, D.C.: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kovacic, W. 1989a. “Failed Expectations: The Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration.” Iowa Law Review 74: 1105–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kovacic, W. 1989b. “Federal Antitrust Enforcement in the Reagan Administration: Two Cheers for the Disappearance of the Large Firm Defendant in Nonmerger Cases.” Research in Law & Economics 12: 173–206.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kovacic, W.1990. `The Antitrust Paradox Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy.“ Wayne Law Review 36: 1413–71.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kovacic, W. 1991. “Accounting for Regulation in Determining the Application of Antitrust Rules to Firms Subject to Public Utility Oversight.” (Mimeo).

    Google Scholar 

  • Kriz, M. 1991 (April 6). “Power Struggle.”National Journal 23: 789.

    Google Scholar 

  • Liebeler, W. 1986. “Whither Predatory Pricing? From Areeda and Turner to Matsushita” Notre Dame Law Review 61: 1052–98.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mahinka, S. 1989. “Antitrust Analysis of Exclusionary Conduct.”Antitrust Law Journal 57: 751–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meeks, J. 1972. “Concentration in the Electric Power Industry: The Impact of Antitrust Policy.” Columbia Law Review 72: 64–130.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Norton, F., and M. Early. 1984. “Limitations on the Obligation to Provide Access to Electric Transmission and Distribution Lines.” Energy Law Journal 5: 47–76.

    Google Scholar 

  • O’Connor, P, S. Levin, J. Cahill, and G. Keenan. 1988. “The Transition to Competition in the Electric Utility Industry.” Journal of Energy Law and Policy 8: 223–51.

    Google Scholar 

  • Owen, B. 1990. “Determining Optimal Access to Regulated Essential Facilities.” Antitrust Law Journal 58: 887–94.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pace, J. 1987. “Wheeling and the Obligation to Serve.” Energy Law Journal 8: 265–302.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pace, J., and J. Landon. 1982. “Introducing Competition into the Electric Utility Industry: An Economic Appraisal.” Energy Law Journal 3: 1–65.

    Google Scholar 

  • Panel Discussion. 1989. “Exclusionary Conduct.” Antitrust Law Journal 57: 723–50.

    Google Scholar 

  • Phillips, A. 1990. “Antitrust Principles and Regulatory Needs.” Antitrust Bulletin 35: 631–75.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pfeffer, J. 1985 (October 31). “Policies Governing Transmission Access and Pricing: The Wheeling Debate Revisited.” Public Utilities Fortnightly 26.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierce, R. 1986. “A Proposal to Deregulate the Market for Bulk Power.” Virginia Law Review 72: 1183–1235.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pierce, R. 1991. “Using the Gas Industry as a Guide to Reconstituting the Electricity Industry.” Research in Law and Economics 13: 7–56.

    Google Scholar 

  • Ratner, J. 1988. “Should There Be An Essential Facility Doctrine?” University of California at Davis Law Review 21: 327–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rosso, D. 1989 (February 16). `Transmission Access — A Crucial Issue for an Industry.“ Public Utilities Fortnightly 18.

    Google Scholar 

  • Smith, V. 1987. “Currents of Competition in Electricity Markets.” Regulation 11, no. 2: 23–29.

    Google Scholar 

  • Temin, P. 1987. The Fall of the Bell System. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Troy, D. 1983. “Unclogging the Bottleneck: A New Essential Facility Doctrine.” Columbia Law Review 83: 441–87.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Tye, W. 1987. “Competitive Access: A Comparative Industry Approach to the Essential Facility Doctrine.” Energy Law Journal 8: 337–79.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tye, W. 1991. TheTransition to Deregulation—Developing Economic Standards for Public Policies. New York: Quorum Books.

    Google Scholar 

  • U.S. Office of Technology Assessment. 1989. Electric Power Wheeling and Dealing: Technological Considerations for Increasing Competition. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office.

    Google Scholar 

  • Watson, K., andT. Brunner. 1977. “Monopolization by Regulated ‘Monopolies’: The Search for Substantive Standards.” Antitrust Bulletin 22: 559–92.

    Google Scholar 

  • Weiss, L. 1975. “Antitrust in the Electric Power Industry.” In Promoting Competition in Regulated Markets, edited by A. Phillips. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

    Google Scholar 

  • Werden, G. 1987. `The Law and Economics of the Essential Facility Doctrine.“ St. Louis University Law Journal 32: 433–80.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Authors

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

Copyright information

© 1992 Springer Science+Business Media New York

About this chapter

Cite this chapter

Kovacic, W.E. (1992). The Antitrust Law and Economics of Essential Facilities in Public Utility Regulation. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Economic Innovations in Public Utility Regulation. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series, vol 10. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3586-7_1

Download citation

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-3586-7_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-6594-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-3586-7

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

Publish with us

Policies and ethics