Abstract
Electric utilities are currently facing competition which is stronger and more widespread than has been witnessed in the past, except perhaps in the very early days of the industry. Competition is manifest particularly for large industrial users. Traditionally competition is associated with increased efficiency. However, in the environment in which utilities operate—a mixture of competition for large customers and near monopoly for small customers—it is not possible to be quite as forceful about the benefits of competition as we normally would. Even the strongest supporters of competition and laissez-faire should consider this a significant transitional problem in the electric utility industry. Managing the transition means that electric utilities and their regulators will have to reconsider longstanding and well-tried practices in electric rate making. This paper will examine some recent developments in rate making and their role in an increasingly competitive environment.
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Crew, M.A., Fernando, C. (1994). Pricing Priority Service: Theory Versus Utility Practice. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 18. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2782-4_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2782-4_7
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