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Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice

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Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities

Part of the book series: Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy ((TREP,volume 18))

Abstract

After decades of criticism by academics and practitioners, rate-of-return regulation is gradually giving way to “incentive regulation.” Since any regulation produces some incentives, the new label is somewhat confusing—moreso because of the diversity of approaches it encompasses, including price caps,2 sliding-scale regulation,3 and yardstick competition.4 The purpose of this paper is to demystify “incentive regulation” (IR) by laying out the key principles it incorporates, examining their implementation in regulatory practice, and evaluating the performance of various IR schemes.5

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Authors
  1. Thomas P. Lyon
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Editors and Affiliations

  1. Center for Research in Regulated Industries, Graduate School of Management, Rutgers University, Newark, New Jersey, USA

    Michael A. Crew

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© 1994 Springer Science+Business Media New York

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Lyon, T.P. (1994). Incentive Regulation in Theory and Practice. In: Crew, M.A. (eds) Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities. Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy, vol 18. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2782-4_1

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-2782-4_1

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-6202-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-2782-4

  • eBook Packages: Springer Book Archive

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