On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games

  • Steven A. Matthews
  • Andrew Postlewaite


The “cheap talk games” studied in this chapter are games in which players with private information exchange payoff-irrelevant messages. (Crawford and Sobel (1982)) and (Green and Stokey (1980)) introduced the simplest cheap talk games, those in which a “sender” with private information sends a message to a “receiver,” who then takes an action. Equilibrium refinement criteria for sender-receiver games have been studied extensively,1 and variations of sender-receiver games have been used to model a variety of phenomena.2 Little work, however, has been done on more general cheap talk games. A few studies have considered multiple informed parties, but with only one round of pre-play communication.3 Even fewer studies have considered games with multiple rounds of communication, and then with only one informed party.4


Belief Function Cheap Talk Equilibrium Payoff Sequential Equilibrium BAYESIAN Game 
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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Steven A. Matthews
  • Andrew Postlewaite

There are no affiliations available

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