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Paying Physicians as Agents: Fee-For-Service, Caption, or Hybrids?

  • Mark V. Pauly
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 20)

Abstract

How physicians should be paid is a key question for privately managed HMOs and insurance plans, administrators of public insurances, and public policy makers. The popular concern usually is with the level of physician net income—do doctors make too much?—but the analytical problem is frequently more concerned with how a given income is earned, and what consequences it has for substitute or compliment inputs and services physicians can control. After all, physician net income is only 12% of total health spending; cutting it by 10% would do little good, but increasing it by 40% might be a bargain if the increase could be coupled with financial incentives to reduce the use of other inputs.

Keywords

Marginal Cost Health CARE Policy Diagnosis Related Group Physician Service Manage Care Plan 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 1995

Authors and Affiliations

  • Mark V. Pauly

There are no affiliations available

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