Abstract
This paper deals with public projects which are only valuable if they are fully completed, although the production requires a fairly long time, maybe years. A good example is constructions whose production is time consuming and which are practically worthless if the production is stopped at some intermediate stage. “Construction ruins” do not have a positive value. A highway which is not completed and stops five miles before the airport, is practically worthless. Similarly, a particle accelerator which is not completed, cannot be used for any meaningful research purpose. Since these projects are only valuable if completed, in the economic sense they are “indivisible,” although their production can be divided into many parts.
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Bös, D. (2001). Incomplete Contracts in Public Procurement. In: Negishi, T., Ramachandran, R.V., Mino, K. (eds) Economic Theory, Dynamics and Markets. Research Monographs in Japan-U.S. Business & Economics, vol 5. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1677-4_8
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1677-4_8
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