Abstract
Usually economic theory is conveniently divided into just two categories: the positive and the normative. But in my view, this is far from a complete taxonomy. This is not to say that “positive” and “normative” are useless labels. It is simply that, by themselves, they leave too much out.
This paper is a revised version of a paper that was delivered in the Harvard Graduate Economics Forum in February 1997. I would like to thank the NSF for research support. It is dedicated to Ryuzo Sato, who, through the Technical Symposia that he oversees at the Japan-U.S. Business and Economic Center, has fostered many kinds of theory.
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Maskin, E. (2001). Kinds of Theory. In: Negishi, T., Ramachandran, R.V., Mino, K. (eds) Economic Theory, Dynamics and Markets. Research Monographs in Japan-U.S. Business & Economics, vol 5. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1677-4_4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1677-4_4
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