Delegated Control of Incentives in Regulated Industries

  • Fabrizia Lapecorella

Abstract

We study the incentive problem faced by a regulator who controls only one of two privately informed firms belonging to a monopolistic industry and relies on this firm for provision of correct incentives to the other.

Keywords

Monopoly 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2001

Authors and Affiliations

  • Fabrizia Lapecorella
    • 1
  1. 1.University of BariItaly

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