Social Institutions, Norms, and Practices
We submit a model of social institutions which binds together the two central components of institutions, a) a “behavioral” system of social practices as repeated patterns of collective intentional actions and b) the normative Üeberbau consisting of a task-right system which on the one hand is influenced and in basic cases even induced by the “underlying” practices and on the other hand serves to stabilize them. An explicit and relatively simple connection in terms of sanctions is drawn between actions which are obligatory or permitted by special positions on the one hand and the “ordinary” course of actions which occurs in social practices within an institution on the other hand. Obligations and rights are not simply bound to actions, but to systems of actions given in the form of systems of social practices. This adds an essential component which has been neglected in formal treatments so far. The inclusion of social practices yields a rich structure in which the emergence and maintenance of of norms can be tackled in a realistic way.
KeywordsCollective Action Social Practice Action Type Social Institution Normative System
Unable to display preview. Download preview PDF.
- W.Balzer and R.Tuomela. (1997). A Fixed Point Approach to Collective Attitudes, in (Holmström Hintikka and Tuomela, 1997), pp. 115–42.Google Scholar
- W.Balzer and R.Tuomela. (2000). Collective Attitudes and the Maintenance of Social Practices. % newblock manuscript.Google Scholar
- M.Barbuceanu. (1997). Coordinating Agents by Role Based Social Constraints and Conversation Plans. Proceedings AAAI-97, 16–21.Google Scholar
- J.S.Coleman. (1974). Power and the Structure of Society. New York: Norton.Google Scholar
- R.Conte and C.Castelfranchi. (1995). Cognitive and Social Action. London: UCL.Google Scholar
- G.Holmström Hintikka and R.Tuomela (eds.). (1997). Contemporary Action Theory. Vol.2, Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
- A.J.I.Jones and M.Sergot. (1997). A Formal Characterization of Institutionalized Power. in E.G.Valdéz et al. (eds.). Normative Systems in Legal and Moral Theory, Berlin: Duncker and Humblodt, pp. 349–67.Google Scholar
- I. Pörn. (1970). The Logic of Power. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
- M.Prietula, K.Carley, L.Gasser, (eds.). (1988). Simulating Organizations: Computational Models of Institutions and Groups. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
- R.Tuomela. (1995). The Importance of Us. Stanford, Stanford University Press.Google Scholar
- R.Tuomela. (2000). Cooperation: A Philosophical Study. Philosophical Studies Series, Dordrecht: Kluwer.Google Scholar
- M.Wooldridge and N.R.Jennings. (1997). Formalizing the Cooperative Problem Solving Process, in (Holmström Hintikka and Tuomela, 1997), 143–61.Google Scholar