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Rent Seeking and International Trade in Agriculture

  • Harry de Gorter
  • Gordon C. Rausser
  • Andrew Schmitz
Chapter
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Part of the Natural Resource Management and Policy book series (NRMP, volume 20)

Abstract

Rent seeking is an important activity in international agricultural trade. Special-interest groups initiate many protectionist trade measures. For example, the United States was recently in a trade war with the European Union over bananas and beef, and with Canada over wheat. The source of each of these particular disputes provides a good example of the various policy instruments generating contestable rents and hence trade frictions: trade rents from import quotas (bananas); domestic rents altered by own and other countries’ domestic policy (wheat); and the non-trade concerns rents (beef)i. “Non-trade concerns” rents refers to rents sought under the hubris of the new trade agenda arising from trade protectionist policies seeking to control food quality, achieve food security, internalize negative and positive externalities (that is, environment and the landscape, respectively), and enhance viability of rural areas.

Keywords

World Trade Organization Bargaining Power Fill Rate Imperfect Competition Uruguay Round 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Harry de Gorter
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Gordon C. Rausser
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Andrew Schmitz
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.Cornell UniversityUSA
  2. 2.University of CaliforniaBerkeleyUSA
  3. 3.University of FloridaUSA

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