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Market Conduct and the Economic Impacts of a Tariff-Rate Quota Policy: The European Banana Case

  • Roland Herrmann
  • Richard J. Sexton
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Part of the Natural Resource Management and Policy book series (NRMP, volume 20)

Abstract

The European Common Market Organization for bananas (CMOB) is currently the most controversial tariff-rate quota (TRQ) policy among the increasing number of TRQs in international agricultural trade. The CMOB was introduced under the pressure of the Single European Act in July 1993. It has affected various countries of the European Union (E.U.) differently, as the previous national banana policies of the member countries implied differential levels of protection. The new policy regime, with a tariff quota as its major feature, has lowered the level of agricultural protection in formerly more protected countries (such as France). But a new trade barrier was introduced for countries that had more liberalized banana-trade policies before 1993. In particular, Germany has experienced higher prices due to the new policy. It is mainly these new barriers which have been discussed in public and criticized for being another policy-induced distortion in the international banana trade (Borrell, 1997).

Keywords

Real Exchange Rate Import Price Market Conduct Imperfect Competition Import Demand 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Roland Herrmann
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  • Richard J. Sexton
    • 1
    • 2
    • 3
  1. 1.University of GiessenGermany
  2. 2.University of CaliforniaDavisUSA
  3. 3.Giannini Foundation of Agricultural EconomicsUSA

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