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Intentionality is the Mark of the Vital

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Part of the book series: Perspectives in Ethology ((PEIE,volume 13))

Abstract

Much of the philosophy of mind has been dedicated to reconciling the mental with the material. But to the extent that the “mental” is seen as equivalent to the “intentional” and the “material” as equivalent to the “biological,” the project of reconciling the intentional with the material is unnecessary. Concepts exhibiting the special logical properties thought to be unique to intentionality are a commonplace in biology. Thus, the special problem of the emergence of intentionality in human evolution, in human conscious and language, and in human culture is neither special nor of problem: in the relevant logical respects, intentionality is, and—has always been immanent in the simplest of biological systems.

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Thompson, N.S., Derr, P.G. (2000). Intentionality is the Mark of the Vital. In: Tonneau, F., Thompson, N.S. (eds) Perspectives in Ethology. Perspectives in Ethology, vol 13. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1221-9_8

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1221-9_8

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5447-5

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-1221-9

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