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Public Choices and Fiscal Means: Analyzing Taxes as Collective Outcomes

  • Walter Hettich
  • Stanley L. Winer

Abstract

Joseph Schumpeter (1981) argued that a people’s spirit is written in its fiscal history, “stripped of all phrases”. There is no doubt that fiscal or tax history is central to a nation’s development and to its ongoing political and economic life. And Schumpeter was surely correct in directing attention to actual fiscal outcomes, rather than to the political discussion surrounding tax policy, where rhetorical phrases and flourishes abound. Fiscal history provides us with a wealth of Information on actual, specific choices made by democratic societies and on the impact of these choices on the economy and on different groups in the country.

Keywords

Public Choice Median Voter Revenue Share Political Equilibrium Private Economy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Walter Hettich
  • Stanley L. Winer

There are no affiliations available

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