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Public Choices and Fiscal Means: Analyzing Taxes as Collective Outcomes

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Politics, Taxation, and the Rule of Law

Abstract

Joseph Schumpeter (1981) argued that a people’s spirit is written in its fiscal history, “stripped of all phrases”. There is no doubt that fiscal or tax history is central to a nation’s development and to its ongoing political and economic life. And Schumpeter was surely correct in directing attention to actual fiscal outcomes, rather than to the political discussion surrounding tax policy, where rhetorical phrases and flourishes abound. Fiscal history provides us with a wealth of Information on actual, specific choices made by democratic societies and on the impact of these choices on the economy and on different groups in the country.

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Hettich, W., Winer, S.L. (2002). Public Choices and Fiscal Means: Analyzing Taxes as Collective Outcomes. In: Racheter, D.P., Wagner, R.E. (eds) Politics, Taxation, and the Rule of Law. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1069-7_6

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-1069-7_6

  • Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5379-9

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-1069-7

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