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Supplying International Public Goods

How Nations Can Cooperate
  • Scott Barrett

Abstract

As discussed in chapter 2, public goods have two important characteristics: use by one party does not diminish the amount of the good available to others, and others cannot be excluded from enjoying a public good, even if they had no hand in its provision. In a national context, public goods provision thus raises two problems. The first is identifying the economically efficient level of provision, a problem of valuation. The second is designing policies and institutions able to supply this level of a good, a problem of incentives. These problems also frustrate the provision of international public goods (IPGs), but in an international context, the difficulties with valuation and the setting of incentives are compounded because, in the absence of a hierarchical command structure, the mechanisms for facilitating the supply of public goods are limited, and often fragile.

Keywords

Public Good Public Good Provision Montreal Protocol Side Payment Trade Restriction 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

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  • Scott Barrett

There are no affiliations available

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