Abstract
Cooperative Game Theory (CGT) provides unique and efficient solutions in situations where decisions can be made both independently and collectively by a relatively small number of agents (players). For these cases, CGT is a better model of rational or efficient behavior than a market model. The latter model assumes a large number of players who do not interact except through market price. From this perspective CGT might be inferior to market models since the comparison among players is not fully captured on the basis of utility scales (as apposed to market price).
Permission to publish this chapter was granted by Kluwer Academic Publishers. The chapter was originally published in Theory and Decision, 32:1–20, 1992.
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Dinar, A., Ratner, A., Yaron, D. (2002). Evaluating Cooperative Game Theory in Water Resources. In: Economics of Water Resources The Contributions of Dan Yaron. Natural Resource Management and Policy, vol 24. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0899-1_12
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0899-1_12
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