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Determining the Competitiveness of Wholesale Electricity Markets

It Starts with Defining the Markets*
  • David Hunger
Part of the Topics in Regulatory Economics and Policy Series book series (TREP, volume 40)

Abstract

In this paper, I examine market definition in the context of FERC’s assessment of the competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets as part of its mandate to ensure “just and reasonable” rates under the Federal Power Act. The Commission has the statutory obligation to determine the competitiveness of wholesale electricity markets in two contexts: (1) in order to ensure “just and reasonable” rates under Section 205 of the Federal Power Act and (2) to determine the effect of a merger or acquisition on competition in the affected markets under Section 203 of the Federal Power Act. In both cases, it needs to define the product and determine the geographic scope of the market in order to make that determination.

Keywords

Electricity Market Ancillary Service Market Definition Geographic Market Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • David Hunger
    • 1
  1. 1.Federal Energy Regulatory CommissionUSA

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