Modeling Practices and “Tradition”

  • Elke Kurz-Milcke
  • Laura Martignon

Abstract

The question is posed whether the concept of tradition can enhance our indepth understanding of scientific modeling and models. We present a progression of uses that the concept has found in the study of science, broadly conceived. From there we take a fresh look at our case study of linear models in judgment and decision making research. We distinguish two traditions in this research area, a ratiomorphic tradition and a paramorphic tradition. We show how the linear regression model was crucial to the inception of these traditions but not to their continuation. Following Galison’s example, we also search out connective areas between the two traditions. These “trading zones” can be found in close proximity to computer and (Monte Carlo) simulations, in particular. Finally, a tradition is also an abstraction, which in the end opens the possibility of using our understanding of modeling to enhance our understanding of the concept of tradition.

Keywords

Migration Calcite Posit Dition Univer 

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2002

Authors and Affiliations

  • Elke Kurz-Milcke
    • 1
  • Laura Martignon
    • 2
  1. 1.Department of PsychologyUniversity of TübingenTübingenGermany
  2. 2.Max Planck Institute for Human DevelopmentBerlinGermany

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