Abstract
”If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.” This American adage, like many an adage, contains an important piece of advice. This paper attempts to provide answers for the question posed in the title. It also discusses the institutional structure that is needed to implement a proper federalist system, if one is desired. Thus, for any country like Sweden that does not already have a strong set of federalist institutions, it provides policy recommendations for the implementation of a strong federalist system. But before considering these recommendations, one must address the question raised by the adage. Is the current political structure broke? Is it sufficiently deficient in achieving its goals to warrant the constitutional and other institutional changes that would be required to create an effective federalism?
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Mueller, D.C. (2004). Why Federalism?. In: Molander, P. (eds) Fiscal Federalism in Unitary States. ZEI Studies in European Economics and Law, vol 6. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0503-7_7
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0503-7_7
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