Abstract
Chapter 8 suggested that essentially every citizen has an interest in popular elections insofar as elections align the interests of government with those of a large subset of its citizens. Unfortunately, not every government that is elected will, in fact, implement the policies preferred by its supporters, nor will every majority be inclined to turn over the reins of policymaking power to future majorities. There is often a conflict between the outcomes of majority rule and the contractarian defense of democratic politics. Chapter 9 demonstrates that an elected parliament should be constrained in several ways if its policies are consistently to advance the interests of a majority of its citizens, both in the present and in the long run.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Congleton, R.D. (2003). Constraining Parliamentary Democracy to Advance the Majority’s Interest. In: Improving Democracy Through Constitutional Reform. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0421-4_9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0421-4_9
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5068-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-0421-4
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