Abstract
Governments, by their nature, are rule-making bodies with the power to enforce the laws and other policies that they choose to adopt. To the extent that rule-making is itself governed by rules, alternative procedures for selecting rules can be analyzed without focusing much attention on the particular public policies under consideration. This property of constitutional analysis allows the present analysis of Swedish constitutional procedures for making new laws to be general in the sense that it applies to any democratic government using similar procedures for selecting new laws in any policy area that may attract governmental interest.
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© 2003 Springer Science+Business Media New York
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Congleton, R.D. (2003). Governance under Constraints. In: Improving Democracy Through Constitutional Reform. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0421-4_6
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0421-4_6
Publisher Name: Springer, Boston, MA
Print ISBN: 978-1-4613-5068-2
Online ISBN: 978-1-4615-0421-4
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