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A Rationale for Assessments of Election Programmes

  • Otto H. Swank

Abstract

The consequences of many policies are complicated and difficult to foresee. In the Netherlands, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis (CPB) assists the government with assessing the consequences of economic policy. In addition, CPB calculates the economic consequences of party programmes before each election for parliament. The main objective of this chapter is to provide a rationale for the latter practice.

Keywords

Majority Rule Median Voter Prefer Policy Direct Democracy Representative Democracy 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2003

Authors and Affiliations

  • Otto H. Swank

There are no affiliations available

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