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Logical Foundations of Social Science Research

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Advances in Research Methods for Information Systems Research

Part of the book series: Integrated Series in Information Systems ((ISIS,volume 34))

Abstract

In this chapter, I want to review the four inferential logics (1) induction, (2) deduction, (3) abduction, and (4) retroduction which we use to develop the conjectures or hypotheses when doing theory development.

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Notes

  1. 1.

    It is important to note here that Popper commonly uses the term statement or scientific statement to mean hypothesis. In “The Logic of Scientific Discovery” (LSD pp. 94), he states, “For we can utter no scientific statement that does not go far beyond what can be known with certainty ‘on the basis of immediate experience’. … every statement has the character of a theory, of a hypothesis.” In LSD pp. 32, he states, “For a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will- conclusions are drawn by logical deduction.”

  2. 2.

    Three Requirements for The Growth of Knowledge, in Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations, 2002 Edition, pp. 326–327.

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Acknowledgments

Some of the material in this chapter previously appeared in: “Using Decision Tree Modelling to Support Peircian Abduction in IS Research: A Systematic Approach for Generating and Evaluating Hypotheses for Systematic Theory Development,” Information Systems Journal 21:5, 407–440 (2011).

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Correspondence to Ojelanki Ngwenyama .

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Ngwenyama, O. (2014). Logical Foundations of Social Science Research. In: Osei-Bryson, KM., Ngwenyama, O. (eds) Advances in Research Methods for Information Systems Research. Integrated Series in Information Systems, vol 34. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-9463-8_2

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