Verification and Arms Control Treaties

  • David Hafemeister


This chapter describes monitoring and verification technologies, which are discussed within the context of arms control treaties. Nations remain in arms control treaties because they judge the disadvantage of controls on nuclear weapons to be far less dangerous than a system with no controls. The failure of the United States to ratify the Comprehensive–Test–Ban Treaty (CTBT) and its subsequent withdrawal from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty are exceptions to a global consensus; the world awaits what is in store for arms control.


Seismic Station Nuclear Weapon Nuclear Explosion Nuclear Test Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


  1. Argo, H. (1986). Arms Control Verification, K. Tsipis, D. Hafemeister, P. Janeway (Eds.), Pergamon, NY.Google Scholar
  2. Center for Monitoring Research, Department of Defense, Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear–Test–Ban Treaty, National Academy of Sciences, National Academy Press, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  3. De Geer, L. (2012). Radiological evidence for low-yield nuclear tests, Science Global Security 20(1), 1–29.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  4. Dunn, L. (1980). Arms Control Verification and On-Site Inspection, Lexington Press, Lexington, MA.Google Scholar
  5. Elachi, C. (1987). Introduction to the Physics and Techniques of Remote Sensing, Wiley, New York.Google Scholar
  6. Dahlman, J. et al (2011). Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban, Springer, NY.Google Scholar
  7. Drell, S. and G. Schultz (2007). Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on its 20th Anniversary, Hoover Press, Palo Alto.Google Scholar
  8. Drell, S. and R. Purifoy (1994). Technical issues of a nuclear test ban, Ann. Rev. Nucl. Particle Sci. 44, 285–327.ADSCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  9. Fetter, S. (1988). Towards a Comprehensive Test Ban, Ballinger, Cambridge, MA.Google Scholar
  10. Fetter, S., et al. (1990). Gamma-ray measurements of a Soviet cruise-missile warhead, Science 248, 828–834.ADSCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  11. Graham, T. (2002). Disarmament Sketches: Three Decades of Arms Control International Law, Univ. Washington Press, Seattle.Google Scholar
  12. Hafemeister, D. (1986). Science and Society Test IX: Technical Means of Verification, AJP 54, 693–699.Google Scholar
  13. ——— (1997). Reflections on the GAO report on the nuclear triad, Science and Global Security 6, 383–393.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  14. ——— (2005). Presidential report to the Congress: Net benefit analysis of US/Soviet arms control, SAGS 13, 209–217.Google Scholar
  15. ——— (2007). Progress in CTBT monitoring, Science and Global Security 15(3), 151–183.Google Scholar
  16. Jeanloz, R. (2000). Science-based stockpile stewardship, Phys. Today 53(12), 44–50.ADSCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  17. Knight, A. (2012). The mysterious end of the Soviet Union, NY Review of Books, 74–78 (April 5, 2012).Google Scholar
  18. Krass, A (1997). The United States and Arms Control, Praeger, New York.Google Scholar
  19. Krepon, M. and D. Caldwell (1991). The Politics of Arms Control Treaty Ratification, St. Martin’s Press, New York.Google Scholar
  20. Krepon, M. and M. Umberger (1988). Verification and Compliance, Ballinger, Westport, CT.Google Scholar
  21. Lindemuth, I. (2009). US–Russian Nuclear Cooperation and the CTBT, Nonprol. Review 16(3), 483–505.Google Scholar
  22. Lynch, H., R. Meunier and D. Ritson (1989). Some Technical Issues in Arms Control, Ann. Rev. Nuclear Particle Science 39, 151–182.ADSCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  23. Moynihan, M. (2000). The scientific community and intelligence collection, Phys. Today 53(12), 51–56.ADSCrossRefGoogle Scholar
  24. National Academy of Sciences (2012). The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Technical Issues for the United States, National Academy Press, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  25. ——— (2005). Monitoring Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear–Explosive Materials, NAS Press, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  26. ——— (2002). Technical Issues Related to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, NAS Press, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  27. Nelson, R. (2002). Low-yield earth-penetrating nuclear weapons, Science and Global Security 10, 1–20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  28. Office of Technology Assessment (1991). Verification Technologies, OTA, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  29. Pifer, S. (2010). The Next Round: The U.S. and Nuclear Arms Reductions After New START, Brookings, Wash., DC.Google Scholar
  30. Richelson, J. (1998). Scientists in Black, Sci. Am. 278(2), 48–55.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
  31. Sabbins, F. (2000). Remote Sensing, Freeman, San Francisco, CA.Google Scholar
  32. Schaff, D., W. Kim and P. Richards (2012). Seismological constraints on prop. low-yield nuc. tests, SAGS 20, 155–71.Google Scholar
  33. Schultz, G., et al (2008). Reykjavik Revisited: Steps Toward a World Free of Nuclear Weapons, Hoover P., Palo Alto.Google Scholar
  34. Sykes, L. (1996). Dealing with decoupled nuclear explosions under a CTBT, Monitoring a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, E. Husebye and A. Dainty (Eds.), Kluwer, Amsterdam, the Netherlands.Google Scholar
  35. Tsipis, K., D. Hafemeister and P. Janeway (Eds.) (1986). Arms Control Verification, Pergamon, Washington, DC.Google Scholar
  36. US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1996). Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, ACDA, Wash., DC.Google Scholar
  37. von Hippel, F. and R. Sagdeev (Eds.) (1990). Reversing the Arms Race, Gordon and Breach, New York.Google Scholar
  38. Zellner, W. (2012). “Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Is there a last chance?” Arms Control Today, March 2012, 14–18.Google Scholar

Copyright information

© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of PhysicsCalifornia Polytechnic State UniversitySan Luis ObispoUSA

Personalised recommendations