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Miscellaneous Games

  • Alan Washburn
Chapter
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 201)

Abstract

In this last chapter we collect some games that have little to do with one another, but which are individually interesting.

Keywords

Average Payoff Stochastic Game Payoff Matrix Signaling Game Game Element 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alan Washburn
    • 1
  1. 1.Operations Research DepartmentNaval Postgraduate SchoolMontereyUSA

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