Games with a Continuum of Strategies

  • Alan Washburn
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 201)


It is not unusual to encounter games where the number of available pure strategies is infinite. Any game where the two players each select a time for action is an example, or a submarine can dive to any depth up to some maximum limit. Intervals of real numbers can of course be artificially subdivided to make the number of strategies finite, but that is merely an approximation technique. Sometimes it may even be enlightening to approximate a subdivided interval by a continuous one. The radio frequency spectrum, for example, contains only finitely many frequencies as far as modern digital receivers are concerned, but there are so many frequencies that for some purposes one might as well think of the spectrum as being continuous. In this chapter we consider games where the choice of strategy is not limited to a finite set.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Alan Washburn
    • 1
  1. 1.Operations Research DepartmentNaval Postgraduate SchoolMontereyUSA

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