Distribution Chains and Market Relationships

  • Letizia Paoli
  • Alessandro Donati


In the fourth chapter, we first analyze the distribution chains composed by legal and illegal suppliers of doping products in Italy, noting that the length of the chain and the legal status of the transactions vary depending on the products exchanged. Given the embeddedness of many supply-side activities in legitimate professions and exchanges, we then argue that the relationships the suppliers develop with each and their customers can often be subsumed under the broad category of white-collar crime. Tout court illegal enterprises also emerge, though, particularly among the suppliers dealing with substances that are illegally manufactured for doping purposes. Although the chapters only analyze empirical data on Italy, the findings here presented can be considered illustrative of the market for doping products in other countries, which have yet not been studied empirically. Future projects are called to ascertain empirically similarities and differences between the Italian market and what remains unexplored elsewhere.


Anabolic Steroid Elite Athlete Corporate Crime Distribution Chain Recreational Athlete 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  • Letizia Paoli
    • 1
  • Alessandro Donati
    • 2
  1. 1.University of Leuven Faculty of Law LINC, Leuven Institute of CriminologyLeuvenBelgium
  2. 2.LiberaRomaItaly

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