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National Standard-Setters’ Lobbying: An Analysis of its Role in the IFRS 2 Due Process

  • Begoña GinerEmail author
  • Miguel Arce

Abstract

As the IASB’s due process sustains, the national standard-setters play a key role in the development of IFRS. There is still much to learn, however, about their lobbying practices, which arguments they use and when they do it. This chapter focuses on the accounting of share-based payments that were under-regulated before IFRS 2. To analyze lobbying behavior of this relevant group of stakeholders, we conduct a content analysis of the 27 comment letters addressing the documents issued by the G4+1 and the IASB that preceded IFRS 2. Consistent with institutional theory, our analysis of lobbying activity by national standard-setters shows that participation increased at the end of the process, and they supported the IASB’s final proposals although they were not as much supportive at the beginning.

Keywords

Stock Option Institutional Theory International Financial Reporting Standard Financial Accounting Standard Board International Accounting Standard Board 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Universitat de València. Facultat d’Economia. Dpt. de ComptabilitatValenciaSpain

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