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Mobile Communication Security Controllers

  • Keith MayesEmail author
  • Konstantinos Markantonakis
Chapter
  • 2.7k Downloads

Abstract

Cellular communication via a traditional mobile handset is a ubiquitous part of modern life and as device technology and network performance continues to advance, it becomes possible for laptop computers, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) and even electrical meters to better exploit mobile networks for wireless communication. As the diverse demands for network access and value added services increase, so does the importance of maintaining secure and consistent access controls. A critical and well-proven component of the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) security solution is the smart card in the form of the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) or USIM, respectively. However, with the enlarged range of communications devices, some manufacturers claim that the hardware selection, chip design, operating system implementation and security concepts are different from traditional mobile phones. This has led to a suggestion that types of “Software SIM” should be used as an alternative to the smart card-based solution. This paper investigates the suggestion.

Keywords

Smart Card Universal Mobile Telecommunication System Near Field Communication Trusted Platform Module Security Element 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.

Notes

Acknowledgments

Originally published in Elsevier Information Security Report 13 (2008); reproduced with kind permission of Elsevier.

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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Information Security Group, Smart Card CentreRoyal Holloway, University of LondonLondonUK

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