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Public Enforcement

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

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Synonyms

Law enforcement by government

Definition

Public enforcement (PE) is a compulsory activity based on the law involving a wide variety of government people such as police, prosecutors, and regulators.

Introduction

Public enforcement (PE) is a government activity sometimes with the use of physical force, involving a wide variety of people in the public sector such as police, prosecutors, and various regulators. In fact, the phenomenon of public enforcement playing such a predominant role is very recent in human history terms.

Believing that an efficient sanctioning mode differs with situations, a number of scholars have examined the issue of enforcement for some time under themes such as “system of social control,” “structure of enforcement,” “modalities of regulation,” or “methods of public control” (Ellickson 1973; Shavell 1993; Posner 2011). In particular, since Becker (1968), scholars have paid special attention to public enforcement and have produced numerous articles.

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References

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Economics, SungKyunKwan University (SKKU), Seoul, South Korea

    Iljoong Kim

  2. CJ Future Management Institute, CJ Corporation, Seoul, South Korea

    Hojun Lee

Authors
  1. Iljoong Kim
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  2. Hojun Lee
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Iljoong Kim .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Kim, I., Lee, H. (2021). Public Enforcement. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_391-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_391-2

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  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Public Enforcement
    Published:
    24 October 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_391-2

  2. Original

    Public Enforcement
    Published:
    26 May 2016

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_391-1

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