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Organization

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Encyclopedia of Law and Economics

  • 11 Accesses

Synonyms

Administration; Governance structure; Group operation; Institution; Network

Definition

Organization is an entity designed to influence behavior and reach collective objectives.

Organization

The raison d’être of organization is cost-effective coordination of incentives for transactions that under private decentralized negotiations fail to generate satisfactory outcomes. Numerous classifications of organizations are possible, by its functions or attribute dimensions, objective (profit versus nonprofit), output type (production, service, administrative) ownership regime (public, private, family, hybrid, partnership); hierarchical structure (flat, steep), financial structure, degree of delegation of decisions and divisionalization, reliance on technology, and innovation; measurability of outputs and inputs, power of incentives, size in labor force, output or asset value, scope measured vertically or horizontally in terms of diversification of output and tasks. In the modern...

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Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Sabanci University, Tuzla, Turkey

    Mehmet Bac

Authors
  1. Mehmet Bac
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Corresponding author

Correspondence to Mehmet Bac .

Editor information

Editors and Affiliations

  1. Montpellier, France

    Alain Marciano

  2. Dept DiGSPES, Univ del Piemonte Orientale Dept DiGSPES, Alessandria, Italy

    Giovanni Battista Ramello

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Bac, M. (2022). Organization. In: Marciano, A., Ramello, G.B. (eds) Encyclopedia of Law and Economics. Springer, New York, NY. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_358-2

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_358-2

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  • Publisher Name: Springer, New York, NY

  • Print ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • Online ISBN: 978-1-4614-7883-6

  • eBook Packages: Springer Reference Economics and FinanceReference Module Humanities and Social SciencesReference Module Business, Economics and Social Sciences

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Chapter history

  1. Latest

    Organization
    Published:
    24 October 2021

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_358-2

  2. Original

    Organization
    Published:
    20 October 2014

    DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_358-1

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