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A Game-Theoretic Approach to Legal Settlements

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Part of the book series: International Series in Operations Research & Management Science ((ISOR,volume 194))

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Abstract

In modern economies, adjudication is the most common means of dispute resolution when voluntary alternatives such as negotiation have been exhausted. This chapter considers the incidence of out-of-court negotiated settlements versus adjudicated outcomes as predicted by the leading game-theoretic model and addresses a number of key questions. How do various offer and acceptance methods affect the terms of out-of-court settlements? Which kinds of cases settle and which go to court? How does private information about the case merits held by one or more sides affect player strategies and outcomes?

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. School of Management, Boston University, 595 Commonwealth Ave, Boston, MA, 02215, USA

    William Samuelson

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  1. William Samuelson
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Correspondence to William Samuelson .

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Editors and Affiliations

  1. , Department of Economics, Pennsylvania State University, University Park, 16802-3306, Pennsylvania, USA

    Kalyan Chatterjee

  2. , School of Management, Boston University, Commonwealth Ave. 595, Boston, 02215, Massachusetts, USA

    William Samuelson

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Samuelson, W. (2014). A Game-Theoretic Approach to Legal Settlements. In: Chatterjee, K., Samuelson, W. (eds) Game Theory and Business Applications. International Series in Operations Research & Management Science, vol 194. Springer, Boston, MA. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4614-7095-3_8

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