Game Theory and the Practice of Bargaining

  • Kalyan ChatterjeeEmail author
Part of the International Series in Operations Research & Management Science book series (ISOR, volume 194)


In this paper, we consider the models of bargaining, both cooperative and non-cooperative, that have appeared in the literature, with a view to understanding what insights these models might have for practitioners. The main conclusion is that the models help us tailor our strategies to specific features of the environment in which bargaining takes place. Bargaining powe is related to these features of the environment and the institutional nature of the bargaining.


Game Theory Private Information Extensive Form Bargaining Game Cheap Talk 
These keywords were added by machine and not by the authors. This process is experimental and the keywords may be updated as the learning algorithm improves.


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Copyright information

© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2014

Authors and Affiliations

  1. 1.Department of EconomicsPennsylvania State UniversityUniversity ParkUSA

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